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According to an attribution analysis of opinion change,
message acceptance is an outcome of inferences concerning why
communicators advocate certain positions (Kelley, 1967, 1971).
It has been shown that message recipients use this inference
process when they have prior knowledge of the pressures that
can influence a communicator to advocate one position over
another and thus to present a biased interpretation of reality
(Eagly, Wood & Chaiken, 1978). The present study employs a
causal modeling techniaue to clarify how recipients' causal
inferences mediate opinion change. Further, it tests the gen-
erality of previous findings by examining the causal inferences
recipients are willing to make in situations where they moder-
ately or strongly disagree with the position advocated.
Causal Inferences and Opinion Change
It is argued that message persuasiveness can depend on
recipients' inferences concerning why a particular position was
advocated. If the position taken by a communicator is consis-
tent with a possible biasing pressure, perceivers will consider
it less valid and conseauently less persuasive. To the extent
that the communicator's position cannot be explained by reci-
pients in terms of an inferred bias, it will be regarded as
providing a more veridical description of reality, and message
persuasiveness will be enhanced.
In the study by Eagly, Wood and Chaiken, subjects were
presented with information concerning a pollution issue
affecting a small town in the West. The town's major industry
had either to institute major changes in its waste disposal
methods, which would risk financial problems for the Company
(proenvironment position), or to institute gradual changes,
which would risk irrevocably polluting a local river (pro-
business position). The issue was described in such a way that
subjects' intial opinions concerning the appropriate solution
were neutral. The communicator was a lawyer, running for mayor
of the town, who was previously affiliated with industrial
or environmental interests. The communication was part of a
proenvironment campaign speech presented to an audience con-
sisting of either Company workers or businessmen dependent on
tourism and environmentalists.
Some subjects received information about the source's
previous interests, which led them to expect him to suffer
from a k no--; ledge bias— that is, to believe his knowledge about
the issue is nonveridical . In general, a knowledge-bias expec-
tancy can arise from communicator's characteristics (as in this
case, his previous affiliation) or from external pressures
(e.g., access to limited information on the isrue). Results
of the Eagly, Wood and Chaiken study showed the source's back-
ground was considered an important influence on his stated
position when the communicator confirmee recipients' knowledge-
bias expectancies. Although communicators confirming know-
ledge-bias expectancies were judged sincere, sincerity did not
imply a valid position since their perception of reality was
thought to be biased. Therefore, such communicators were less
persuasive than those di sconf irming knowledge-bias expectancies
Similarly, it was proposed that the information about
3the audience's opinion led recipients to expect the communica-
tor to suffer from a reporting bias— that is, to believe his
willingness to convey an accurate version of external reality
is compromised. In general, a report ing-bias expectancy can
stem from communicator attributes (e.g., extreme politeness)
or from situational pressures (in this case, the information
subjects received about the audience's opinion). Results indi-
cated the audience's opinion was thought an important influence
on the stated position when the communicator confirmed reporcing-
bias expectancies. Communicators confirming report ing-bias
expectancies were viewed as insincere, since their stated
viewpoints were not necessaril/ their true ones, and their
position was viewed as relatively invalid and was unpersuasive
.
This analysis can be related to Kelley's (1972) discoun-
ting and augmentation principles. The possible causes of a
communicator's stated position are situational pressures, his
or her characteristics, and the external reality represented in
the message. When an expectancy is confirmed, the plausible
person- or situation-bared cause leads to the discounting of
external reality alone as a cause. Conversely, the augmenta-
tion principle suggests that di sconfirming an expectancy
based on a possible situation- or person-based cause facilitates
the strength of external reality as the cause.
A number of studies can be interpreted within this frame-
work. Communicators advocating positions inconsistent with
their personal characteristics or the situation, and thus
disconf irming expectancies, were generally rated more honest,
4sincere, expert, and impartial, and were significantly more
persuasive than those confirming expectancies (Cooper, Darley
& Henderson, 1974; Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Swing, 1942; Goethals,
1976; McKil Lip, 1975; McKillip & Edwards, 1975; McPeek & Edwards
1975; Mills & Jellison, 1967; Walstar, Aronson, & Abrahams,
1966). In addition, Koeske and Crano (1968) demonstrated that
a communicator confirming expectancies suffered a slight loss
in credibility but was eoually persuasive when compared to a
control communicator, about whom no expectancies were formed.
However, few of these studies measured the recipients' expec-
tancies concerning the advocated position. Since the predicted
effects were not always obtained (e.g., Koeske & Crano, 196R;
McPeek & Gross, 1975), expectancies may not always have beer,
correctly established. Furthermore, since few studies consi-
dered recipients' causal inferences, few actually attempted
to specify the mechanisms underlying these effects.
Mediation of Opinion Change
Information about communicator characteristics and situa-
tional pressures can be employed at different stages of the
inference process. Before receiving the communication, reci-
pients use this information to form premessage expectancies.
After recipients receive the message, such information forms
the basis for postmessage inferences concerning why a particu-
lar position was expressed.
Recipients' causal inferences, specifying why the source
took the advocated position, are thought to be the first post-
message step In the cognitive mediation of opinion change.
5These causal inferences allow recipients to judge whether the
communicator is biased, and thereby form the second link. In
the last step, opinion change is thought to be directly deter-
mined by recipients' perceptions of communicator bias. In
Figure 1, the hypothesized relationship between these deter-
minants and opinion change is represented in a path model.
Insert Figure 1 about here
•
Opinion change is not directly related to recipients' causal
attributions, but is affected by them through their impact on
recipients' perceptions of whether the communicator's message
is biased. The link between communicator bias and opinion
change has been previously established (Eagly, Wood & Chaiken,
1978). However, the present study will provide a more detailed
test of the model by employing path analysis to examine the
relationship between each of the above mediators and opinion
change.
In addition to these attributional determinants, reci-
pients' reception of the message content has been related to
persuasion (McGuire, 1969; Eaoly, 1974), and so recall of the
message arguments is included in the path analysis as a direct
determinant of opinion change. However, the relation between
the proposed attributional mediators cf opinion chance and
argument recall is less clear. In the present study, it is
predicted that recipients will primarily focus on the non-
content cues relating to communicator credibility instead of
conducting a detailed analysis of the message content.
Following Chaiken (Note 1), we assume that recipients will
evaluate the communication on the basis of the more easily
obtained non-content cues when the message topic is not partic-
ularly involving for subjects and their opinions on the issue
have no forseeable future consequences. Recipients in the
present study should be motivated by these economic concerns
in analyzing the message, and their reception of message
arguments should depend on the availability of conclusive infor-
mation about whether the source is biased.
Examining the Generality of Causal Inference Mediation
The analysis provided by Eagly, Wood and Chaiken assumes
that response to a compelling reality is the one Dlausible
reason for the communicator to advocate a position inconsistent
with his or her characteristics or the situation. It is possi-
ble, however, that there are circumstances under which reci-
pients may not be willing to attribute such expectancy-discon-
firming messages to external reality. For example, if the
position advocated by the communicator is strongly discrepant
from recipients' positions, and is therefore unacceptable tc
recipients, they may not consider external reality a plausible
cause.
Consistent with this viewpoint, social judgment theory
(Sherif & Hovland, 1961) proposes chat the recipient's initial
opinion on an issue serves as a reference point against
which
to evaluate the communication. If the message
position is
close to the recipient's opinion, and is thus
located in the
latitude of acceptance, it should produce change
towards the
message, whereas message positions highly discrepant from the
recipient's opinion are in the latitude of rejection, and
produce little or no attitude change.
The present study provides a test of the generality of
previous research by manipulating the discrepancy between
recipients' initial positions and the advocated position, thus
affecting the causal inferences recipients may be willing to
make. It was predicted that regardless of whether expectancies
are confirmed or disconf irmed
,
message positions extremely
discrepant from recipients' opinions would be unlikely to be
attributed to external reality, would be considered biased,
and would be relatively unpersuasive. However, because the
messages of communicators advocating moderate positions could
be attributed to external reality, their persuasiveness would
depend on whether they confirmed or disconf irmed recipients'
knowledge-bias expectancies.
In this study, a communicator who was either in favor of,
against, or had no specified position on the issue of freedom
of speech advocated a moderate or extreme position on the issue
of -restricting pornography. Communicators confirmed exoecten-
cies by advocating a position on pornography consistent with
their orientation on freedom o* speech, disconf irmed expec-
tancies by advocating an inconsistent position, or represented
the control group if they had no specified orientation
on freedom of speech. The communicator's position on porno-
graphy always opposed recipients' positions.
The design manipulated Subjects' Initial Positions on
8Pornography (pro- vs. antirestrictions
) , Expectancy Confirma-
tion (confirmed vs. disconfirmed vs. control) and
Extremity of Advocated Position (moderate vs. extreme). For
simplicity, only information concerning a possible knowledge
bias was provided. However, it is assumed that results would
be similar for a reporting bias manipulation.
Method
Sub j ec t
s
A total of 487 female undergraduate psychology students
participated for course credit: 288 served as persuasion sub-
jects and 79 served as expectancy subjects. Since the design
renuired that subjects receive a communication which opposed
their initial position on the message topic, 120 subjects who
had indica:ed a neutral position on this issue during the
pretest were removed from the analysis.
Procedure
Subjects were recruited with the understanding that they
would participate in an impression formation experiment. Par-
ticipation was to entail reading information about another
student's opinions on certain campus issues and then giving
impressions of the student. Subjects were run in groups of
'* 5 or less.
At the beginning of the session, an opinion pretest was
administered with the rationnale that the subjects' own values
and belief s "would be important in determining the impressions
they formed. The pretest supposedly measured subjects' over-
all orientation on various campus issues. It consisted of
issues, including the message topic.
Participants then received a written description of the
experiment. it was explained that they would read the tran-
scripts from two (actually hypothetical) interviews conducted
as part of a psychology experiment last fall. Subjects were
told that the previous experiment was concerned with measuring
peoples' opinions: Specifically, it examined the relation
between someone's opinions given in an experimental setting
on the topic of freedom of speech and their opinions given at
a later time on the issue of showing pornography on campus.
During the first interview, participants were assigned several
topics to consider and were asked to give their opinions on
the topics as well as their reasons for supporting these posi-
tions. Subjects were told they would read the interviewees'
opinions only on the freedom of speech issue. The second inter-
views were supposedly conducted with the same students three
weeks after the first interview. Subjects were told that in
order to insure a realistic measure of opinions, interviewees
were not aware of the connection between the first and second
interview. The second interviews were conducted in a variety
of situations to determine the effects of various circumstances
as well as time on interviewees' opinions. Also, it was men-
tioned to subjects that the issues chey would be reading about
are somewhat controversial, and all sides are represented in
the collection of transcripts. Therefore, subjects might read
an interview in which the opinions expressed are quite dif-
ferent from their own. A final note indicated that the
^0
transcripts were made available through the cooperation of Dr.
Rinehardt
.
While subjects were reading the description of the inter-
view transcripts, the experimenter collected the preopinion
questionnaires. Each subject's opinion on the pornography
topic was identified so that the appropriate second interview
transcript (which contained the persuasive message) could be
administered. Subjects then received the two transcripts. in
the first interview, Jim H. , the interviewee, was represented
as having a strongly polarized orientation on the issue of
freedom of speech. The second interview (containing the per-
suasive message) consisted of a graduate student asking Jim
for his position on the issue of restricting pornography on
campus. In response to these cuestion, Jim presented four
arguments, three of which supported his stated position and
one which countered it. The arguments were factual, indicating
that pornoaraphy has either a beneficial or detrimental effect
on viewers. Further details of Jim H.'s background orienta-
tion and the persuasive message are described below.
Subjects took about ten minutes to read the interview
transcripts. They then completed a cuest ionnaire on which they
again indicated their opinions and gave other responses.
Finally, subjects were debriefed and excused.
Expectancy subjects were treated identically but were not
exposed to a persuasive message. They estimated the likelihood
that the communicator would advocate either a moderate or
extreme position on the opposite side of the neutral point from
11
their own position. Expectancy subjects also responded to most
of the other measures described below.
Independent Variables
Subjects' initial position
. Subjects who were initially
in favor of restricting pornography (those indicating positions
of 1 to 6 on a 15-point scale ranging from "Strongly in favor
of restrictions" to "Strongly against restrictions") read
second interview transcripts in which Jim H. took a position
against restrictions on pornography. Subjects who initially
indicated their position as against restrictions (scale points
10 to 15) read second interviews in which Jim H. took a
position in favor of restrictions.
Confirmation of expectancy
. It was intended that the
communicator's background, varied to reflect either a pro- or
antifreedom of speech orientation, would lead to the inference
that a knowledge bias would operate. When advocating a posi-
tion on pornography that was consistent with his orientation
(profreedom of speech source advocating antirestrict ions or
antifreedom of speech source advocating pror strictions), Jim
H. confirmed the expectancy based on his knowledge bias. Jim
H. disconf i rmed knowledge-bias expectancies when he advocated
a position on pornography that was inconsistent with his
orientation on freedom of speech.
When Jim H. was profreedom of speech, he was portrayed as a
member of the local Unitarian Church and he was in favor of abor
tion. He remarked that he had written a paper for a journalism
course last year on the issue, so the topic was one he knew
12
something about. Support for unlimited freedom of speech was
further conveyed by the following statements:
"I very definitely think that everyone should have
complete freedom of speech. Censoring another person'spoint of view, or an art form—which is one way peopleexpress themselves— i s truly violating their rightsYou have to remember that censorship is a relativething—what's offensive and degrading to me may notbe to anyone else."
When Jim H, was against freedom of speech, he was presented as
a member of the Catholic Church, he was against abortion, and
he had written a paper on the issue of freedom of speech for
a religious studies course. His orientation against unlim-
ited freedom of speech was further conveyed by the following
statements
:
"I very definitely do not think that everyone should
have unlimited freedom of speech. There are basic
human principles— like the right not to be exploited
and the right to be treated like a human being—which
are a lot more important then a concept like freedom of
speech. When people feel these principles are being
violated, they must be allowed to imp'ose some humane
standards, on what is publicly broadcast—what we read
and see.
In the control conditions, information about Jim H.'s background
orientation was not presented.
In the persuasive message, Jim H. stated that he had
recently read an article about pornography indicating that it
has some clearly identified effects on viewers. When anti-
restrictions, Jim's two major arguments were that pornography
had a "carthart ic-1 ike effect on people" and that Scandinavian
census data showed a decrease in sex- related crimes since the
legalization of pornography. In the prorestrictions message,
pornography was said to encourage modeling behavior in viewers
13
and Scandinavian census data was said to reveal an increase
in sex-related crimes since pornography has been legalized.
Extremity of the persuasive message
. in the second inter-
view, Jim first stated that he felt either moderately or strong-
ly about the pornography issue. When advocating a moderate
position, Jim said that while there were good reasons on both
sides of the issue, "I guess it possibly should(n't) be allowed
on campus." When supporting an extreme position, Jim stated
that there were several good reasons for his position and that
"I definitely think it should(n't) be allowed on campus."
Measuring Instruments
Expectancies
. On a 15-point scale ranging from "Very
likely" to "Very unlikely," expectancy subjects rated the like-
lihood that the communicator would advocate either a moderate
or extreme position on the opposite side of the neutral point
from their own position.
Manipulation checks . Subjects indicated, on two 15-
point scales, the extent to which the communicator had pre-
viously supported unlimited freedom of speech and estimated the
second interviewer's opinion on the pornography issue.
Opinions . Subjects indicated their initial and final
opinions on the freedom of speech issue on a 15-point scale
ranging from "Do want to restrict pornography on campus" to
"Do not want to restrict pornography on campus." The mid-
point was labeled "Uncertain."
Causal Inferences . On 15-point scales anchored by
"Extremely important" and "Extremely unimportant," subjects
14
judged the influence of several factors on the communicator's
stated position: (a) his previous position on freedom of speech
and (b) the factual evidence concerning restricting pornography.
In addition, it was tnought subjects mignt infer that the
second interviewer was constraining the communicator's stated
position on the pornography issue. Thus, subjects also rated
the importance of the second interviewer's opinion on restric-
ting pornography.
Perception of communicator . Subjects rated the communi-
cator on 15-point bipolar evaluative scales. Positive poles
were consistent, honest, sincere, non-opportunistic, non-
manipulative, non-compliant, open-minded, unbiased, objective
and likeable.
Message comprehension . Subjects were asked to indicate
(on the opinion scale described above) the overall position
taken by the communicator as well as to write down each argu-
ment he had used to support his Dosition. Argument recall was
scored for correctness by two independent raters (r=.84, 82%
agreement) who were blind to subjects' experimental conditions.
Other measures . On 15-point scales, subjects judged the
communicator's "true, private opinion" on the issue as well as
the relative importance of restricting pornography in compari-
son to other social issues. Subjects were also asked to writ-
down their interpretations of the experiment. Two raters
coded these responses for disbelief in the cover story
and
belief that the message was presented to test subjects'
per-
suasibility. One subject was identified as suspicious of
the
15
cover story (Kendall's tau=1.00) and was removed from the
analysis. Although 23 subjects were identified as suspicious
of our persuasive intent (Kendall's tau=.75), they were not
removed from the analysis for two reasons: they were unevenly
distributee across experimental conditions (13 from the control
group, 6 from the expectancy confirmed conditions, and 5 from
the disconf irmed ) , and previous literature has shown that sub-
jects' suspicion of the experimenter's persuasive intent has no
clearly identified relation to their opinion change (McGuire, 1969)
Results
The hypotheses were examined with the appropriate Subjects'
Initial Position X Confirmation of Expectancy X Extremity of
Advocated Position analysis of variance and related contrasts.
Manipulation Checks
Subjects classified as initially in favor of restricting-
pornography averaged premessage positions .of 4.12 on the 15-
point opinion scale described above, while those against
averaged positions of 12.33. Analysis of premessage positions
yielded no other effects.
The design reauired that message positions strongly dis-
crepant from recipients' initial opinions be considered
more
poi.rized than those moderately discrepant. Subjects' judg-
ments of the message position revealed an Initial
Position X
Extremity interaction, indicating that this
recuirement was met
(£ 4.001). -Flanned comparisons
showed that both pro- and anti-
restrictions recipients viewed the extreme message
as more
polarized (Ms=13. 93 and 1.81, respectively) than
the moderate
\
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message (Ms=11.02 and 4.93; p_s<.001).
Judgments of the communicator's orientation on freedom of
speech indicated that his background was correctly established.
Planned comparisons shewed the source with a profreedom of
speech orientation was judged more in favor of freedom of speech
than either the anti or control source (_p_s < .001)
,
while the
control source was considered more in favor than the anti source
(p_£.001). As the experimental design in Table 1 indicates,
Insert Table 1 about here
the communicator's orientation is arranged so that these effects
yielded an Initial Position X Confirmation interaction (jd^.OOD.
(See Table 2 for means. ^ No significant effects were obtained
in the analysis of estimates of the second interviewer's
Insert Table 2 about here
opinion on restricting pornography.
Further evidence concerning the adequacy of the experimen-
tal design was provided by the expectancy control subjects'
likelihood ratings. A Confirmation main effect (£<C.001) and
planned comparisons revealed that the communicator was judged
more likely to advocate messages which confirmed (antifreedom
of speech source advocating pro restrictions and pro freedom of
speech source advocating antirestric tions ) rather than disccn-
firmed knowledge-bias expectancies (M=12.04 vs. M=4.1 ; £<.01).
Also, it was desirable for the communicator to be rated equally
likely to advocate a moderate or extreme position. In support,
expectancy subjects' likelihood ratings revealed no Extremity
17
main effect.
The design also required that, prior to message delivery,
perception of the communicator be unrelated to the communicator's
background orientation. This requirement was adequately met:
Expectancy subjects' perceptions of the
-communicator demonstrated
that communicators were essentially equivalent across conditions.
Only on ratings of open-mi ndedness , which yielded an Initial
Position X Confirmation interaction (£^.05), were the two sources
perceived differently: The communicator with the profreedom of
speech orientation was marginally more open-minded (p_<..10, posthoc
Opinion Change
Opinion change scores were formed by treating change
towards the advocated position as a positive difference, and
change away as a negative difference.'' The Confirmation main
3
effect was marginally significant, F_ ( 2
,
2 7b ) = 2 . 5 7
,
p_<.03.
Planned comparisons indicated that subjects changed their opin-
ions more when the message confirmed rather than disconfirmed
their knowledge-bias expectancies (jd£.03), while neither the
confirmed nor disconfirmed conditions differed from the control
group. (See Table 2 for means.) In addition, neither the ini-
tial position nor extremity manipulations affected opinion chang .
Causal Inferences
Ratings of the importance of the communicator's orientation
in determining his stated position indicated that his
background had the predicted effect on subjects' causal infer-
ences. The Confirmation main effect was significant (p_<.001).
Planned comparisons revealed that his orientation was more
18
important when confirming instead of disconf irming expectancies
(£< .001). Both confirmed and disconfirmed conditions differed
significantly from the control condition (£s£.001; see Table 2).
Ratings of the importance of factual evidence in influencing
the source's position also had the intended effect on causal
inferences. The Confirmation main effect was significant
(£^.01). Planned comparisons indicated that factual evidence
was a more important influence on the communicator's stated
position in the disconfirmed rather than confirmed conditions
(£<.01). Facts were also rated more important in the discon-
firmed than the control conditions (£^.01), while the con-
firmed and control conditions did not differ (see Table 2).
No significant effects were obtained in the analysis of
the importance of the second interviewer's opinion on restric-
ting pornography. In addition, subjects' initial positions and
extremity of the message had no effect on ^any measures of
perceived causation.
Perceptions of the Communicator
A factor analysis (varimax rotation) specifying a three
factor solution ' yielded factors accounting for 20.4%, 16.3%
and 12.0% of the total variance. These factors were labeled
"Sincere" (e.g., honest, sincere), "Unbiased" (e.g., open-
minded, unbiased) and "Nonmanipulative" (e.g., nonopportunis-
tic, nonmanipulative), respectively. The consistent and objec-
tive scales, which failed to load highly on these factors,
were analyzed separately. Factor scores were computed for each
subject and then treated by analysis of variance (see Table 3).
19
Insert Table 3 about here
The unbiased factor yielded a Confirmation main effect (p_< .001)
and planned comparisons showed the source to be more biased
when confirming rather than disconf irming expectancies (£< .01).
The disconfirmed conditions differed marginally from the control
conditions (p_<.10), whereas the confirmed did not. No signifi-
cant effects were obtained on either of the other factors.
Similar to the unbiased factor, ratings of objectivity
yielded a Confirmation main effect (p_<.001), and planned com-
parisons showed the communicator to be more objective when he
disconfirmed instead of confirmed expectancies (jd<.001). The
confirmed cells differed significantly from the controls
(_p_^.01), whereas the disconfirmed did not. Also, the communi-
cator was considered more objective when advocating a moderate
rather than extreme position (jd<.01). Ratings of the source's
consistency revealed a Confirmation main effect (jo^.001), and
planned comparisons showed the communicator to be more consis-
tent when confirming rather than di sconf irming a knowledge-Lias
expectancy (£<.001), and both confirmed and disconfirmed condi
tions differed from the controls (£S<.001).
Recall of Argumentation
Recipients' recall of the arguments presented in the mess=
showed a marginally significant Confirmation main effect (£=.C
see Table 3). Planned comparisons revealed that fewer argument
were recalled in the disconfirmed than the control conditions
(£<.05), and marginally fewer than in the confirmed conditions
(£<.07). The confirmed and control conditions did not differ.
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Other Dependent Measures
As Table 3 indicates, the communicator's true, private
opinion on restrictions was considered to be more polarized in
conditions in which the source's orientation was consistent with
the position advocated and the control conditions than in condi-
tions in which his orientation was inconsistent with the posi-
tion advocated. Thus, an Initial Position X Confirmation inter-
action proved significant (jd^.OOI). Planned comparisons
showed communicators advocating pro instead of anti to be sig-
nificantly more in favor of restrictions in the confirmed and
control conditions (p_<.01), while only marginally more in favor
in the disconfirmed conditions (p_<.10). Two other significant
effects v/ere reasonable in view of the nature of the manipula-
tions: (a) an Initial Position main effect showed that communi-
cators were thought more in favor of restrictions when advo-
cating pro rather than anti- positions (p_<T.001) and (b) an
Extremity main effect showed communicators were considered
more in favor of the message position when advocating extreme
(vs. moderate) positions (p_<.01). In addition, examination of
the means in Table 3 reveals that ratings were lower than
predicted in the two conditions in which subjects were initially
pro, the source advocated an extreme position, and confirmed
or disconfirmed expectancies. These deviant results contri-
buted to an Initial Position X Extremity interaction (p^.001),
a Confirmation main effect (p_<.05), and a marginally signifi-
cant Initial Position X Confirmation X Extremity interaction
(£ <.10)
.
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Ratings of the importance of the issue revealed that it
was generally neither important nor unimportant (M=8.86). An
Initial Position main effect showed that subjects initially
in favor of rather than against restrictions felt the issue was
more important (jd< .001).
Mediators of ODinion Chanae
-
-
1
A path analysis, based on the average within-cell correla-
tions presented in Table 4, was conducted to examine the cogni-
Insert Table 4 about here
tive mediation of opinion change. The causal direction speci-
fied by our model is as follows: Inferences invoking the
communicator's orientation and inferences about the factual
evidence relating to the issue were treated as exogenous
variables (variables not influenced by others in the system),
and together were thought to affect perceptions of the source's
bias (i.e., validity of the message). Perceptions of the
source's bias were thought to affect reception of the argumen-
tation presented in the message. Both bias ratings and argument
recall were considered direct determinants of opinion change.
Since the information on which recipients based their causal
inferences depended on the Confirmation manipulation, this
model was tested separately on the confirmed, disc on firmed and
control conditions.
The model specified in Figure 1 was the one originally fit
to all three experimental conditions. To test the model ,
the
logic of path analysis required that, initially, three separate
multiple regression equations be run. Source bias, argument
22
recall and opinion change were each predicted from those vari-
ables causally prior, and paths representing nonsignificant
relationships were deleted, leaving only significant or mar-
ginally significant predictors in the equation* Each of the
regressions was run again, with only the previously determined
significant predictors in the equation, and the beta weights were
interpreted as path coefficients.
In condi tions where the source disconfirmed expectancies,
perceptions of source bias were first regressed on inferences
about orientation and inferences about facts. The relationships
represented by the paths between these three variables depicted
in Figure 2a were all found to be significant and were retained
Insert Figure 2 about here
in the model. Inferences about orientation and those about facts
were negatively related (£=-,16; p<.10). Inferences about
orientation were negatively related to perceptions of source
bias (3 = -. ""7; r>C* n ), whereas inferences about facts were
positively related to bias ratings (B=.24; £<.05). The orien-
tation and facts measures together accounted for 10% of the
variance in bias ratings (R=.32; pOOOl). Next, inferences
about orientation, those about facts, and perceptions of bias
were regressed on argument recall. Only perception of bias
was significantly related to argument recall (£=-.21; £<.05).
Last, inferences about orientation, those about facts,
percep-
tions of bias, and argument recall were all combined
in a
regression equation predicting opinion change. Neither
type of
inference was significantly related to opinion change,
while
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both bias ratings and argument recall were positively related
to opinion change (Bs=. 40 and .32, respectively; p_s<.001), and
together accounted for 21% of its variance (R=.46; ££.001).
The same model was fitted to the data in conditions where
the source confirmed expectancies. However, the relationship
between perceptions of the source's bias and reception of argu-
ments was nonsignificant (£=-.10; p>.30), and the path was
dropped from the model. Arguments recalled was then specified as
an exogenous variable as shown in Figure 2b. Inferences about
orientation and those about facts together were found to account
for 14% of the variance in perceptions of bias (R_=.37; ££.001).
Similarly, bias ratings and argument recall were found to account
for 10% of the variance in opinion change (R_=.32; £<«001).
In the control conditions, bias ratings were again found
to be nonsignif icantly related to argument recall (£=.02; p>.30)
In addition, neither inferences about orientation nor those
about facts were significantly related to bias ratings (B=-.ll
and .15, respectively; £s > . 10 ) . Thus, both bias ratings and
argument recall are exogenous variables specified in the model
in Figure 2c. The two variables together accounted for 13%
of the variance in opinion chance (R_=.36; ££.001).
Pi scussion
The findings replicated those obtained by Eagly, Wood and
Chaiken (197B) and provided additional support for the attribu-
tion interpretation of opinion change: A communicator advoca-
ting a position which disconfirmed the expectancy based on
his
background orientation was more persuasive and perceived as
less
24
biased than one advocating a confirmatory position. Other
dependent measures were consistent with these results. It was
also demonstrated that the findings generalized over messages
moderately and strongly discrepant from recipients' initial
positions
.
Evidence that the heightened persuasiveness of communi-
cators disconf irimirg expectancies was due to the hypothesized
attributional mechanisms rather than other factors is provided
by expectancy subjects' perceptions of the communicator. Since
communicators in all conditions were judged essentially eauiva-
lent prior to message delivery, differences in opinion change
cannot be explained through, for example, agreement with an
attractive communicator.
Knowledge-bias expectancies were established by portraying
the communicator as having a strong commitment for or against
freedom of speech on the basis of his religious preferences
and ideological positions. That these expectancies enable
people to infer the communicator's position on related issues
was illustrated by expectancy subjects' likelihood ratines:
Communicators were considered likely to advocate a position on
the topic of restricting pornography which was consistent with
their Orientation on freedom of speech.
Causal Inferences and Perception of the Communicator
Recipients' explanations of the communicator's position
were affected by whether the message confirmed or disconfirmed
their expectancies. Communicators confirming knowledge-bias
expectancies were perceived to be responding in terms of their
background orientation. However, the positions of communica-
tors disconfirming expectancies could not be attributed to
their orientation, and so were perceived as more valid, since
they were explained through an accurate representation of
external reality. Thus, recipients rated the factual evidence
relating to the message topic an important influence on communi-
cators who disconfirmed expectancies;. It should be noted that
when Eagly, Wood, and Chaiken had subjects rate the importance
of facts, instead of factual evidence, no differences due to
expectancy confirmation were obtained. It is likely that this
slight wording difference accounts for our more successful
resul ts.
The validity of the communicator's position was determined
by recipienbs on tine basis of these causal inferences. Commu-
nicators advocating message positions whicn were unexpected on
the basis of their background orientation were perceived to be
less biased than communicators advocating expected positions.
In contrast, all communicators were perceived to be ecually
sincere.
Recipients' estimates of the source's true opinion were
affected by expectancy confirmation since these estimates were
based on both his orientation and the position advocated.
Communicators whose advocated positions were consistent with
their background orientation were generally thought to have
the most polarized opinions, whereas communicators whose posi-
tions were inconsistent with their orientation were thought to
have opinions towards midscale. Estimates of the true opinion
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of control communicators were based solely on their stated
opinion, and recipients considered their opinions to lie between
those of consistent and inconsistent communicators.
Argument Recall
As noted in the introduction, when the message topic is
of little importance to recipients, they may employ a relatively
superf icia'J. strategy in processing the communication, which
would cause them to yield to message conclusions on the basis
of non-content cues (Chaiken, Note 1). Since subjects in the
present study did not consider restricting pornography an
important issue, it was assumed that when possible, they would
tend to adopt a relatively simplistic decision rule, focusing
on information concerning whether the source was biased instead
of analyzing the message content. Results showed that reci-
pients of a disconf irming communication recalled fewer argu-
ments and so were less receptive to message content than
recipients in confirmed and control conditions. It appears that
recipient.- relied more heavily on the source-bias decision
rule when the communicator disconf irmed expectancies, because
in. such conditions relatively conclusive information about
the cause of the advocated position and the degree of source
bias was available. When the communicator disconf irmed
expectancies, the only plausible reason for his position
was
a response to external reality, whereas there
were several
plausible causes of the confirmed and the control
communicator's
positions. Similarly, disconf irming communicators
were
perceived to be the least biased, and the control
and the
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confirming communicators were not considered to differ in
their degree of bias.
In contrast, Eagly and Chaiken (1975) found araument recall
to be greatest when the communicator disconfirmed knowlege-
bias expectancies. These seemingly contradictory results can
possibly be explained in terms of message importance: Eagly
and Chaiken employed relatively involving topics (the future
incidence of VD and the future job market facing undergraduates).
It was probably important for recipients to hold knowledgeable
opinions on these issues since they would have to address them
again at a later date. In this case, information about source
bias as well as the message content may hwe been employed by
recipients in determining the validity of the message. Commu-
nicators advocating disconf irming messages were perceived as
unbiased, and this may have highlighted the importance of their
messages, leading the recipients to retain the message argu-
ments more than recipients of a confirming message.
Mediators of Opinion Change
Path analysis provided support for the cognitive mediation
of opinion change specified by our framework. It was originally
hypothesized (accordinn to the model specified in Figure 1)
that recipients' causal inferences invoking factual evidence
and those invoking the source's orientation would be predictors
of perceptions of the extent to which the source was biased.
In turn, perception of source bias was thought to determine
opinion change. Although not part' of the present
attribution
analysis, argument recall provided a measure of
recipients'
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reception of the message content, and so was included in the
path model as a direct determinant of opinion change, and was
expected to be more important when recipients believed there
was more than one plausible cause of the communicator's position.
The hypothesized model was fitted separately to the
confirmed, the disconf irmed , and the control conditions because
the information provided to subjects was varied according to
experimental condition. Examination of Figure 2 reveals that
slightly different models were found to fit each of the three
conditions. Results showed that recipient s • causal inferences
generally had the hypothesized effects on their perception of
source bias. In the confirmed and disconfirmed conditions,
recipient?' attributions of the advocated position to the
communicator's orientation were causally related to a perception
of the source as more biased. In contrast, recipients' infer-
ences invoking the factual evidence of the issue predicted a
perception of the communicator as less biased. The importance
of each causal inference in determining perception of source
bias was related to expectancy confirmation. In the discon-
firmed conditions, perceivers' inferences about factual evi-
dence were a somewhat more important determinant of their
perceptions of source bias than inferences concerning the
communicator's orientation, whereas the reverse was true for
the confirmee conditions. In the control conditions, however,
recipients' 'causal inferences were not a significant determinant
of perceived bias or opinion change, presumably because
information about the communicator's background, which formed
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the basis for recipients' inferences, was not provided.
The relationship between perception of source bias, argu-
ment recall and opinion change was also partly dependent upon
expectancy confirmation. Only in the disconfirmed conditions
were recipients' perceptions of communicator bias found to be
a significant predictor of argument recall--the more unbiased
the communicator was perceived to be, the fewer the arguments
recalled. To the extent that recipients perceived there to
be clear-cut causal information in the disconfirmed conditions,
they were able to pay less attention to the message content.
Perceptions of the communicator as unbiased and greater
argument recall were always determinants of greater opinion
change. In both the confirmed and the disconfirmed conditions,
recipients' oerceptions of source bias were a somewhat more
important determinant of opinion change than the arguments
recalled, whereas the persuasiveness of control communicators
was determined slightly more by reception of arguments than
perceptions of bias.
The results indicated that the experimental manipulations
affected opinion change primarily through these mediating
processes: Expectancy confirmation directly affected reci-
pients' causal inferences, had an indirect imoact on
perception
of source bias through its effect cn causal inferences,
and
affected opinion change primarily through these two
mediators.
Consistent with the path analysis, analysis of variance
indicated that expectancy confirmation had a large
effect on
recipients' causal inferences, less of an effect on
perception
30.
of source bias and an even weaker impact on opinion change.
Generality of the Results
It was originally hypothesized that the persuasiveness of
messages moderately discrepant from recipients' initial positions
would be sensitive to the exoectancy confirmation manipulation,
whereas extremely discrepant messages would be too dissimilar
to recipients' opinions to be attributed to reality, and so
would be perceived as relatively biased. However, no differ-
ences were obtained between moderate and extreme messages.
Since recipients perceived the extreme messages to be signifi-
cantly more polarized than the moderate, it appears that
extremity was in fact manipulated.
There are several possible explanations for the ineffec-
tiveness o^ the discrepancy manipulation. First, it may be
that recipients' causal inferences are truly not dependent on
their agreement with the communicator's position. Alternatively,
other factors in the present experiment may have contributed
to this result, such as possible demand characteristics. Since
the recipients were providing information for an experiment,
they may have been motivated to give us veridical information.
Instead of using their own opinion on the issue as a reference
point from which to evaluate the communicator's position,
recipients may have engaged in a more objective analysis, so
that a response to external reality was a plausible cause of
all message positions. Outside of the experimental situation,
recipients may be more willing to evaluate the message in terms
of their own opinion, and the predicted effects may occur.
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Another explanation is provided by social judgment theory.
This argues that the width of recipients' latitudes of rejec-
tion (the range of opinions they find objectionable) is affected
by their ego-involvement in the issue. Since subjects did not
consider the message topic important, it is assumed to be
relatively uninvolving. Social judgment theory suggests that
recipients have narrow latitudes of rejection in response to
uninvolving issues, and so the strongly discrepant message may
not have fallen within these limits. However, if the study had
employed a more involving message topic, the predicted effects
may have been obtained. In any case, we can conclude that under
the present experimental conditions, the obtained effects
generalize over the range of discrepancy represented in this
study
.
The experimental design included an internal replication
in that subjects initially in favor of restricting pornography
received an antirestrict ion communication whereas these against
received a communication in favor o^ restrictions. Since the
analvsis of subjects' initial opinions revealed no sionificant
effects, our resul ts also proved general over these two
communications.
i
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Footnotes
!• All posthoc comparisons were analyzed according to the
Schef f e procedure.
2. Analysis of covariance on recipients 1 postmessage positions,
employing premessage positions as a covariate , resulted in
findings similar to the analysis of change scores.
3. The analysis of opinion change employing a one- tailed test
of significance yielded a significant Confirmation main effect
(p < .05 ) . A one-tailed test was thought appropriate in this
situation since previous research clearly demonstrated the
direction of the predicted difference between experimental
conditions : Di scon firming expectancies should heighten message
persuasiveness in relation to control conditions, whereas
confirming expectancies should have the opposite effect.
4. On the initial run, four factors were obtained, but the
fourth was deleted due to the small amount of variance it
accounted for (10.2%) and the difficulty in its interpretation.
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Table 1
Experimental Design
Subjects initially
f avored restricting
pornography
Subjects initially
opposed restricting
pornography
Confirmation
of Expec-
tancy
Source
advocated
moderate
antire*-
strictions
Source
advocated
extreme
antire-
strictions
-r
Source
advocated
moderate
prore-
strictions
Source
advocated
extreme
prore-
s trictions
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
prof reedom
of speech
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
prof reedom
of speech
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
antif ree-
dom of
speech
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
antif ree-
dom of
speech
Disconf irmed
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
antif ree
dom of
speech
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
antif ree-
dom of
speech
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
prof reedom
of speech
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
prof reedom
of speech
Control
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
not
provided
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
not
provided
Source '
s
orienta-
tion :
not
provided
Source 1 s
orienta-
tion :
not
provided
Note , Expectancy cell ns ranged from 9 to 11. Persuasion
cell ns ranged from 23 to 25.
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Table 4
Average Within Cell Correlations Between
Possibl e Mediators
Knowledge bias disconf irmed
1
1 . Inferences about orientation
2 • Inferences about facts
3. Ratings of source bias
4. Argument recall
5. Opinion change
Knowledge bias confirmed
-
1 . Inferences about orientation
2 I nf erences about facts
3. Ratings of source bias
4 • Argument recal
l
5. Opinion change
Control
1 . Inferences about orientation
2 . Inferences about facts
3. Ratings of source bias
4 . Argument recal
1
5. Opinion change
41
Figure' 1. Proposed causal model for path analysis depicting
the hypothesized relationship between mediators and opinion
change. The single-headed arrows denote hypothesized causal
paths. The two-headed arrow denotes an unanalyzed correlation
among exogenous variables.
42
43
Figure 2. Above figures show results of the path analysis for
( a) disconf irmed ? (b) confirmed and (c) control conditions.
Path coefficients with an asterisk are marginally significant;
all others are significant beyond the .05 level . Un analyzed
correlations among the exogenous variables are appended to the
paths with double arrows.
44
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